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Notes
A NEW TAKE ON PUBLIC USE: WERE KELO
AND LINGLE NONJUSTICIABLE?
DAVID L. BREAU
The blinding light of familiarity seems to obscure from observation
the details of what goes on beneath it.
—Robert L. Hale

1

INTRODUCTION
When Suzette Kelo sued to prevent New London, Connecticut,
from using eminent domain to acquire her home, the Court would
have been consistent with its standing jurisprudence if it had
dismissed the case for lack of standing. Suzette Kelo was the named
plaintiff in Kelo v. City of New London,2 a 2005 takings decision that
generated significant criticism nationwide3 when the Supreme Court
ruled that New London could use eminent domain to force the sale of

Copyright © 2006 by David L. Breau.
1. Our Equivocal Constitutional Guaranties, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 576 (1939).
2. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Jeff Jacoby, Editorial, Eminent Injustice in New London, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 26, 2005, at D11 (“These five justices, . . . I hope someone looks at their property and says,
‘You know, we could put that land to better use—why don’t we get the town to take it from
them by eminent domain.’ Then maybe they would understand what they’re putting my father
through.” (quoting Mike Cristofaro, son of one of the Kelo plaintiffs)); T.R. Reid, Missouri
Condemnation No Longer So Imminent; Supreme Court Ruling Ignites Political Backlash,
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, at A2 (“[A]ll over the country, [Kelo] has sparked a furious
reaction, with politicians of both parties proposing new legislation that would sharply limit the
kind of seizure the . . . decision validated.”); Benjamin Weyl, Activist Tries a Grab for Jurist’s
Property; A Foe of the High Court’s Ruling Wants to Apply It to Seize David H. Souter’s Home,
L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2005, at A10 (describing an activist’s apparently serious suggestion that the
city of Weare, New Hampshire, use eminent domain to acquire Justice Souter’s vacation home
in order to build a new hotel).
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4
homes from residents who had lived in them for decades. Although
the Court’s standing jurisprudence, when taken at face value, suggests
that the homeowners in Kelo may not have had standing to sue,5 the
Court never considered that possibility because of an assumption that
claims based upon private property interests are more suitable for
judicial resolution than less traditional claims that often must
overcome significant justiciability hurdles before being addressed on
the merits.6
The ban on citizen suits prevents federal courts from hearing
cases in which a plaintiff seeks to vindicate “the right, possessed by
every citizen, to require that the [g]overnment be administered
7
according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted.”
Consequently, a suit by a citizen seeking an injunction against a city
planning a downtown redevelopment project would be dismissed if
the sole grounds for suit were that the plan would not actually create
jobs or increase tax revenue.8 Of course, the Kelo plaintiffs were not
merely concerned citizens—they were losing their homes.9 Rather
than accept the city’s offer to pay the just compensation required by
10
the Takings Clause, the Kelo plaintiffs sought to enjoin the taking of
their property on the ground that it failed to satisfy the Fifth

4. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
5. Kelo was an appeal from Connecticut’s Supreme Court, and although state courts may
hear cases that do not qualify as Article III cases or controversies, the Supreme Court must
nevertheless ascertain a litigant’s standing in a case that arises from state court. See Sec’y of
State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954–55 & n.4 (1984) (noting that the
Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to hear cases arising from state court that do not
satisfy Article III standing requirements); see also U. S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715,
721 n.** (1990) (following “longstanding precedent in ascertaining the third-party standing of a
respondent in a case arising from state court”).
6. See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
7. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (noting that “although a suitor may derive great comfort
and joy from the fact that the United States Treasury is not cheated . . . or that the [n]ation’s
laws are faithfully enforced,” that interest cannot be vindicated in federal court).
8. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (“[A taxpayer’s] interest in the
moneys of the Treasury . . . realized from taxation . . . is shared with millions of others; is
comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment
out of the funds, [is] so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal
to the preventive powers of a court . . . .”).
9. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
10. In fact, many of the residents in the neighborhood that would be used for the
redevelopment plan had willingly sold their homes to the city. Id. at 2658.

03__BREAU.DOC

2006]

8/22/2006 8:49 AM

PUBLIC USE

837

11
Amendment’s requirement that a taking be “for public use.” Among
other things, they argued that the taking of their properties would not
result in any public benefit because the development plan was
12
unlikely to create jobs or increase tax revenue, as the city claimed.
Although the Kelo homeowners would be injured if they were
13
forced to sell their homes, those injuries would exist regardless of
whether the redevelopment plan succeeded wildly or failed miserably.
Suppose that city planners had decided that the New London
waterfront would be an ideal location for a sports stadium or another
clearly public facility.14 In such a case, the impact on waterfront
property owners would be identical—they would be forced to
exchange their homes for just compensation—but they would be
unable to sue to enjoin the takings on a public use ground.15 Put
another way, the use to which taken property is put is unrelated to the
injury, and consequently to the rights, of its former private owners. In
this light, the plaintiffs in Kelo are no more harmed by a failure to
comply with the Public Use Clause than is any other citizen with an
interest “that the [g]overnment be administered according to law.”16
17
Similarly, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., a regulatory takings
case argued the same day as Kelo, could have been dismissed for lack
of standing. In Lingle, the Chevron Corporation challenged an act
passed by the Hawaii legislature that capped the rent that oil

11. Id. at 2666–67. The Takings Clause states in its entirety, “nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667.
13. See id. at 2668 (“[W]e do not minimize the hardship that condemnations may entail,
notwithstanding the payment of just compensation.”).
14. See id. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he sovereign may transfer private
property to private parties . . . who make the property available for the public’s use—such as
with a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium.”).
15. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (“Equitable relief is not
available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law,
when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign . . . .” (footnote omitted)); id.
at 1018 n.21 (“To the extent that the operation of the statute provides compensation, no taking
has occurred and the [property owner] has no claim against the Government.”); see also First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314–15 (1987) (“[The
Takings Clause] does not prohibit the taking of private property, . . . but rather . . . secure[s]
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.” (citations
omitted)); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) (“The rights of these property owners are
satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the
price of the taking.”).
16. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922). To be clear, the argument that public use
claims are nonjusticiable was as plausible before Kelo was decided as afterwards.
17. 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
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companies could charge gasoline dealers who lease company service
18
stations. The legislature hoped that the act would encourage dealers
to lower retail gasoline prices,19 but Chevron argued the act was so
economically unsound that it could even cause an increase, rather
20
than a decrease, in prices at the pump. Chevron claimed that
because the act was unlikely to actually benefit the public, it violated
the Public Use Clause and should be enjoined as an unconstitutional
regulatory taking.21
The ban on citizen suits would prevent an unhappy consumer
from suing to enjoin a state’s price-control regulation on the ground
that the regulation’s economics would be unlikely to actually lower
22
prices. Suppose that another state had enacted a gasoline-price
regulation that capped wholesale prices directly and actually lowered
the cost for consumers. Gasoline companies such as Chevron would
be identically injured by such a regulation but could not prevail on a
takings claim.23 The Lingle Court acknowledged as much in its
holding—on the merits—that the Takings Clause provided no basis to
invalidate the Hawaii rent cap. Justice O’Connor, writing for a
unanimous Court, explained that a regulation’s effectiveness is
irrelevant for determining whether it results in an unconstitutional
taking:

18. Id. at 2079.
19. Id. at 2078–79.
20. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1187 (D. Haw. 2002), aff’d sub
nom. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Bronster, 363 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. Lingle, 125 S.
Ct. at 2074.
21. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2079.
22. Cf. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922) (“Plaintiff has only the right,
possessed by every citizen, to require . . . that the public moneys be not wasted. Obviously this
general right does not entitle a private citizen to institute [a suit] in the federal courts.”).
23. See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 516–18 (1944) (explaining that
price-control regulations do not violate the Takings Clause); see also, e.g., FCC v. Fla. Power
Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987) (“[S]tatutes regulating the economic relations of landlords and
tenants are not per se takings.”); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 440 (1982) (“States have broad power to regulate . . . the landlord-tenant relationship . . .
without paying compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation entails.”); Fed.
Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 582 (1942) (“The authority of
Congress to regulate the prices of commodities in interstate commerce is at least as great under
the Fifth Amendment as is that of the States under the Fourteenth to regulate the prices of
commodities in intrastate commerce.”); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (holding that a
rent control ordinance was not a compensable taking); cf. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing
Se., Inc. v. United Distribution Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 215 (1991) (noting that Congress has
authority to set “just and reasonable” rates for natural gas); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944) (same).
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The owner of a property subject to a regulation that effectively
serves a legitimate state interest may be just as singled out and just
as burdened as the owner of a property subject to an ineffective
regulation. It would make little sense to say that the second owner
24
has suffered a taking while the first has not.

In other words, the constitutional infirmity—potential failure to
25
benefit the public—did not cause Chevron’s harm. As such,
Chevron’s interest in effective gas-price control is no greater than,
and is perhaps even less than,26 that of any other Hawaii gasoline
27
consumer.

24. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2084.
25. See id. (“[A]n ineffective regulation may not significantly burden property rights at all,
and it may distribute any burden broadly and evenly . . . . The notion that such a regulation
nevertheless ‘takes’ private property . . . merely by virtue of its ineffectiveness or foolishness is
untenable.”); see also id. at 2083–84 (“[W]hether a regulation of private property is effective in
achieving some legitimate public purpose . . . reveals nothing about the magnitude or character
of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property rights.”). In Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the Court suggested that a regulation was an unconstitutional
taking solely because it did not “substantially advance legitimate state interests.” Id. at 260.
Lingle overruled this aspect of Agins, noting that its language there had been “regrettably
imprecise.” 125 S. Ct. at 2083.
26. The interests of Hawaii gasoline consumers in affordable gasoline directly conflict with
Chevron’s interest in maximizing its profits from selling gasoline, and decoupling Chevron’s
injury from the failure to benefit the public by lower gas prices exposes the inherent conflict of
interest that exists in suits to enjoin takings on a public use ground. See infra notes 141–43 and
accompanying text. When Chevron raised the claims of Hawaii gasoline consumers as the basis
for enjoining the Hawaii rent cap, it was, in effect, basing its claim for relief on the interests of
third parties not before the Court. In other contexts, such cases have been dismissed under the
Court’s third-party standing doctrine. See infra Part II.
27. The ban on citizen suits is generally, though not always, considered to be a prudential
standing limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 524 U.S. 1, 12 (2004); see also infra note 125. However, the plaintiffs’ suits in Lingle
and Kelo could be seen as suffering from a constitutional standing infirmity as well—namely, a
lack of causation. The success or failure of New London’s redevelopment plan has little bearing
on the Kelo plaintiffs’ injuries. See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text. Likewise, the
effectiveness of the Hawaii rent cap in benefiting consumers in no way causes Chevron’s injury.
See supra text accompanying notes 22–27. In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the Court
explained that a “claim of injury cannot support standing [when] the injury alleged is not fairly
traceable to the government conduct . . . challenge[d] as unlawful,” id. at 757 (emphasis added).
Such a tight fit between the injury and the allegedly illegal conduct is not always required,
however. For example, the Court was willing to grant standing to plaintiffs who challenged the
construction of two nuclear power plants on the ground that “in the event of a nuclear accident
their property would be ‘taken’ without any assurance of just compensation.” Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 69 (1978). Because a federal statute had
limited liability for private industry and enabled Duke Power to construct the plants, the Court
found that the statute was the “but for” cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries and that, as such, the
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the statute’s constitutionality. Id. at 77. In Kelo and Lingle,
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Of course, takings claims have long been adjudicated by federal
28
courts, and it would be preposterous to deny homeowners like those
in Kelo standing to sue to enjoin the forced sale of their homes—an
29
injury if there ever were one. The intention of this Note is not to
argue that Kelo and Lingle should have been dismissed as
nonjusticiable—that would have been an unnecessarily radical
departure from the Court’s takings jurisprudence, not to mention
politically unwise for the Court.30 Nor does this Note seek to reclassify
these cases as standing decisions in disguise—they clearly are not.
Rather, this Note highlights the tension between the Public Use line
of takings decisions and the Court’s standing jurisprudence, namely,
that a consistent application of standing doctrines to future takings
cases with facts similar to those in Kelo and Lingle could lead to
surprising outcomes. Surprising because, although the Framers
probably did not intend the Constitution to enshrine liberal
natural-rights ideology to the exclusion of all else,31 protecting private
too, the taking of the plaintiffs’ property was the “but for” cause of the injuries to the plaintiff.
In each case, however, the “conduct challenged as unlawful” was not the taking itself but the
government’s use of the property once taken. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660
(2005); Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2079. As such, the injury to the plaintiffs was not “fairly traceable”
to that conduct—i.e., the failure to use the taken property for the public—and, consequently,
the element of causation necessary for Article III standing was absent.
28. See, e.g., W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 533–34 (1848) (adjudicating
a takings claim).
29. One of the plaintiffs had lived in her house since her birth in 1918; she had lived there
with her husband since they were married in the 1940s. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. Suzette Kelo
had “made extensive improvements to her house, which she prize[d] for its water view.” Id.
30. One can only imagine the reaction if the Court were to duck the issue on procedural
grounds, given the uproar that followed the Kelo decision on the merits. See, e.g., Timothy
Egan, Ruling Sets Off Tug of War over Private Property, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at A1
(describing the “storm of legislative action and protest” in the wake of Kelo).
31. “The great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting
themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property.” JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 368 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690); see
also DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 15 (1992)
(explaining that for Locke, “[p]roperty was a general political term referring to all the personal
and political rights of individuals”).
There is an ongoing debate about the relative importance to the Founders of Lockean
liberalism on the one hand and of republican government ideals on the other. SCHULTZ, supra,
at 11–13. For those who emphasize the Lockean influence, “[t]he hallmark of liberal
constitutionalism is a vision of law and society emphasizing a harsh, overarching separation of
the private and the public, the individual and the state.” WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 21 (1996). For
example, Professor Richard Epstein views the Takings Clause as the constitutional embodiment
of a strict natural-rights theory of property in the tradition of Locke, which, according to
Epstein, requires the government to make a property owner “whole” when it acts in any way
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property from arbitrary government interference was surely one of
32
33
their main objectives, either as an end in-and-of itself or as a means
to the end of securing individual liberty.34
Courts are unlikely even to suggest that standing may be an issue
in cases such as Kelo and Lingle,35 not because such a suggestion is
doctrinally untenable, but because of an often-unstated assumption
that the individual right to private property asserted in such takings

that limits the owner’s property rights. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 52–53, 57–92 (1985).
Others counter that history does not support this view, characterizing it as the product of the
misconceptions of “property-minded advocates of minimalism [who] all too often portray the
nineteenth century’s constitutional doctrines as having religiously fostered . . . sweeping
protection to private rights in property as a matter of fundamental law.” Harry N. Scheiber, The
Jurisprudence—and Mythology—of Eminent Domain in American Legal History, in LIBERTY,
PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION BEFORE THE NEW DEAL
217, 218 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989). Scheiber contends that “[t]he
history of our eminent domain law has been one of tension between economic individualism and
community values,” id. at 231, and that “[early American] judges gave a good deal of sustained
attention to producing a theory of ‘public rights’ . . . [to balance] against constitutional mandates
for the protection of private [property] rights,” id. at 218. Novak explains that the common law
principle of salus populi suprema lex est (the welfare of the people is the supreme law)—in other
words, the supremacy of the public interest—was at least as important a limit on private
property rights in the early days of the United States as its perhaps better-known cousin, sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your own so as not to injure another). NOVAK, supra, at 35–
50; see also SCHULTZ, supra, at 21 (“[T]he founders . . . realized that at times property might
have to be limited for public necessity.”); cf. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 64 (1977) (noting that as late as 1800, “there still existed a
perhaps dominant body of opinion maintaining that individuals held their property at the
sufferance of the state”).
32. “[T]he right to acquire and own property was undoubtedly a paramount value for the
framers of the Constitution.” JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 43 (1992); see also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST
NO. 1, at 36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (recommending adoption of the
Constitution because of the protection it “afford[s] to the preservation of [republican]
government, to liberty, and to property” (emphasis omitted)); see also infra notes 105–06.
33. Justice Patterson spoke for many of the Founders when he described property as a
“natural, inherent, and unalienable right[]” and explained that “[t]he preservation of
property . . . is a primary object of the social compact.” Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
34. Thomas Jefferson and other early Republicans had a functional view of property rights
that differed from Lockean conceptions of property. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER,
COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 27–37 (1997) (“Jefferson’s doctrine asserts . . . the social character of
property rights . . . . Property was valued not as an end in itself but as a foundation for
republican government.”); see also ELY, supra note 32, at 43 (explaining that “the framers saw
property ownership as a buffer protecting individuals from governmental coercion”).
35. Justice Blackmun was willing to suggest such a possibility in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003, 1043 n.5 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also infra notes
151–58 and accompanying text.
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36
cases is more valuable than the public interest. Courts “assume that
the core values, which the individual interest asserts, are
presumptively superior to the core values that the competing public
37
interest involves.” Many standing doctrines have evolved to keep
ideologically driven plaintiffs out of court.38 If it is true, however, that
habit and history rather than principled legal reasoning prevent these
39
doctrines from being applied in cases such as Kelo and Lingle, then
perhaps their application in other contexts ought to be questioned as
well. Part I examines the similarities between the Court’s respective
interpretations of the condition that a taking be “for public use” and
the condition that Congress exercise its taxing power “for the general
welfare.” Part I also explores whether the effective nonjusticiability of
the latter has implications for the former. Part II returns to, and
elaborates on, the standing issues lurking within Kelo and Lingle and
questions why those issues are raised in some types of cases—for
example, environmental suits—but not in cases that concern
traditional property rights.

I. “FOR PUBLIC USE” IS “FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE”
Kelo reaffirmed “the broader and more natural interpretation of
40
public use as ‘public purpose’” and upheld a city’s use of eminent
domain to acquire homeowners’ property for a downtown economic
redevelopment plan because “that plan unquestionably serve[d] a
public purpose.”41 Justice Thomas dissented because, in his view, the
“most natural reading” of the Public Use Clause requires “either the
government or its citizens as a whole [to] actually ‘employ’ the taken
property.”42 In addition to supporting his position with various
Founding-era documents,43 Justice Thomas drew a comparison from

36. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 156
(2003).
37. Id.
38. See infra notes 145–46, 164–66 and accompanying text.
39. Cf. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 1 (1990) (“The
Framers’ preoccupation with property generated a shallow conception of democracy and a
system of institutions that allocates political power unequally and fails to foster political
participation.”).
40. 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2662 (2005).
41. Id. at 2665.
42. Id. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
43. See, e.g., id. (citing a 1773 dictionary for the definition of “use”).
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language in the Constitution itself. He noted that “the phrase ‘public
use’ contrasts with the very different phrase ‘general Welfare’ used
44
elsewhere in the Constitution.” Accordingly, he explained, “The
Framers would have used some such broader term if they had meant
45
the Public Use Clause to have a similarly sweeping scope.”
The “sweeping scope” to which Justice Thomas referred is “the
46
wide range of discretion permitted to the Congress” concerning its
power under Article I “[t]o lay and collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts
47
and provide for the . . . general Welfare.” The Court has repeatedly
explained that “[t]he discretion . . . is not confided to the courts” to
decide “between one welfare and another, between particular and
48
general,” and “[w]hether the chosen means appear bad, unwise, or
unworkable to [the Court] is irrelevant.”49 Unless there is “no
reasonable possibility [that] the challenged legislation fall[s] within
50
the wide range of discretion permitted to . . . Congress,” the Court
will not scrutinize the decision “unless the choice is clearly wrong, a
display of arbitrary power, [and] not an exercise of judgment.”51 This
level of deference to Congress is such that the Court has “questioned
whether ‘general welfare’ is a judicially enforceable restriction at
all,”52 and commentators have described the condition as “effectively
53
nonjusticiable.”
If “public use” means actual use by the public, as Justice Thomas
would prefer, then that question would certainly be amenable to a

44. Id.
45. Id. at 2680.
46. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936).
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
48. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91
(1976) (per curiam) (“Congress has concluded that the means are ‘necessary and proper’ to
promote the general welfare, and we thus decline to find this legislation without the grant of
power in Art[icle] I, § 8.”).
49. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91 (quotations omitted).
50. Butler, 297 U.S. at 67.
51. Davis, 301 U.S. at 640.
52. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987).
53. Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195,
197 (2001); see David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1197, 1200 (2004) (“Dole’s requirement that spending programs serve the ‘general welfare’
is, by the Court’s own admission, nonjusticiable.”); Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to
Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds,
37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 161 (2004) (“There is no justiciable limit on the expenditure of funds . . .
for ‘the General Welfare.’”).
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judicial determination. Currently, however, a taking is for public use
54
as long as it “serves a public purpose.” For physical takings, at least
five Justices are unwilling to engage in any means-ends analysis,55 and
for regulatory takings, the Lingle Court unanimously agreed that the
Public Use Clause does not license courts to scrutinize a regulation’s
effectiveness in achieving its stated public purpose.56 Rather, such
heightened scrutiny would “present serious practical difficulties” and
57
is “a task for which courts are not well suited.” But once public use
is understood to mean “public purpose” and is satisfied by a
legislature’s “not irrational” determination that a taking is for public
use,58 the level of scrutiny that applies is similar to that which applies
in general welfare cases. Perhaps, then, the Public Use Clause could
fairly be described as what it appears to be—effectively
nonjusticiable.
59
The nonjusticiability of the General Welfare Clause is
consistent with the prudential limitation on citizens’ ability to sue for
60
general violations of the taxing and spending powers. Taxpayers are
usually unable to sue the government for injunctive relief on the
grounds that an alleged taxing and spending violation will increase

54. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005).
55. See id. at 2667–68 (upholding a legislature’s “not irrational” public use determination,
and comparing that result to Lingle).
56. Although Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist are no longer on the Court,
this is unlikely to change significantly the Court’s direction on these issues in the near future.
Because the decision in Lingle was unanimous, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2077 (2005), it is unlikely that
their replacements will impact the Court’s position on this issue. Kelo was a 5–4 decision, but
neither Justice O’Connor nor Chief Justice Rehnquist were in the majority. 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
57. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2084–85; see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“[C]ourts are ill-equipped to evaluate the efficacy of proposed legislative initiatives.”).
58. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665, 2667.
59. There appears to be a slight distinction between “effective” nonjusticiability and actual
nonjusticiability. The Court’s description of its role in General Welfare Clause challenges is that
it will decline to decide them unless there is “no reasonable possibility” that the challenged
conduct is within the scope of Congress’s powers. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936).
A case that is actually nonjusticiable, however, cannot be adjudicated even if there is no
reasonable possibility that the government could act as it did. See Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph
H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954 n.4 (1984) (noting that standing is a jurisdictional
requirement). The General Welfare Clause might be described as subject to review more
deferential than even rational basis review, rather than as nonjusticiable in the Article III sense.
Regardless, the point is that commentators, and even the Court itself, have no qualms about
labeling the General Welfare Clause nonjusticiable, while declining to describe the Public Use
Clause in the same terms.
60. Baker, supra note 53, at 197.
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61

their tax burden. Such suits are nonjusticiable because the grievance
is a generalized one—a taxpayer’s “interest in the moneys of the
Treasury . . . is shared with millions of others . . . and the effect upon
future taxation, of any payment out of the funds [is] so remote,
fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to
the preventive powers of a court.”62 Although taxpayer suits are
dismissed because the Taxing and Spending Clause does not give rise
to an individual right to seek a judicial remedy, courts are also
disinclined to adjudicate such claims because they perceive
themselves to be ill equipped to decide issues in which matters of
public concern outweigh matters of individual concern.63
The Takings Clause, by contrast, often has been understood as
granting an individual right to enjoin the government from taking
64
property when not for a public use, as if that clause in fact stated
“Private property shall not be taken except for public use, nor without
65
just compensation.” The condition that a taking be for public use has

61. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
101 (1968) (granting taxpayer standing to challenge an expenditure that allegedly violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment). Although later plaintiffs sought to extend Flast
to allow taxpayer standing when a tax or expenditure violated other parts of the Constitution,
the Court has consistently limited Flast to Establishment Clause violations. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93 (2d ed. 2002).
62. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 487.
63. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 896 (1983) (noting that courts “have in a way been
specifically designed to be bad at [protecting rights that can be vindicated through the
democratic process]”); cf. Flast, 392 U.S. at 130 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It seems . . . clear that
public actions, whatever the constitutional provisions on which they are premised, may involve
important hazards for the continued effectiveness of the federal judiciary.”).
64. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930) (“[T]he question what is a public
use is a judicial one.”), quoted in Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2673 (2005)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also SCHULTZ, supra note 31, at 28 (describing an 1837 New
York case that “represented one of the first state cases where the judiciary failed to defer to a
legislature” about a determination that a taking was for public use).
65. JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES,
at II (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888). Although the Takings Clause does not expressly forbid
takings for private use, “the courts have universally read [the Takings Clause] as a proscription
against takings for a private purpose.” Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in
Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 205 (1977). From the text itself, it is “questionable”
whether the Public Use Clause was intended as a limitation at all.
If the intent had been to make the words, public use, a limitation, the natural form of
the expression would have been: “Private property shall not be taken except for
public use, nor without just compensation.” It is certainly questionable whether
anything more was intended by the provision . . . than as though it read, “Private
property shall not be taken under the power of eminent domain without just
compensation.”
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been considered part of the individual cause of action created by the
66
Takings Clause as a whole. Accordingly, whereas the Court’s review
of general welfare under a “no reasonable possibility” standard67 has
68
led to viewing that condition as nonjusticiable, the Court’s review of
69
public use under a “not irrational” standard has led to a different
assessment.70 Because the Takings Clause (as part of the Bill of
Rights) creates an individual right while the Taxing and Spending
Clause (as part of Article I’s delegation of powers to Congress) does
not, the Court and commentators reasonably describe public use
LEWIS, supra.
66. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost
Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1161 (2005) (“If the government is
otherwise acting within the bounds of its authority, it cannot be enjoined from seizing property
under the clause, but it can be ordered to pay judicially determined ‘just compensation’ after the
fact. . . . By negative implication, when a taking is not for a ‘public use,’ the owner can enjoin
it . . . .” (emphasis added)); Thomas E. Roberts, Facial Takings Claims Under Agins-Nectow: A
Procedural Loose End, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 623, 626 (2002) (“[C]ourts disregard the fact that
the remedy for a taking is compensation when they freely entertain takings claims that seek
injunctive relief.”).
The Court has expanded this cause of action beyond the Framers’ intentions. Specifically,
regulatory takings did not exist before Justice Holmes’s famous “too far” formulation in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922). The general consensus is that the
drafters of the Fifth Amendment did not consider government regulation to fall within the
purview of the Takings Clause. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding
of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 791 (1995) (claiming
that the Fifth Amendment was originally interpreted to require compensation “when the
government physically took property”); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1057 n.23 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“James Madison, author of the Takings Clause,
apparently intended it to apply only to direct, physical takings of property . . . .”); id. at 1028
n.15 (majority opinion) (“Justice B[lackmun] is correct that early constitutional theorists did not
believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all . . . .”).
Changing conceptions of property may have influenced the development of the
regulatory takings doctrine. “Under the classical conception, actual dispossession was required
before ownership rights were violated and property was taken. By contrast, . . . modern legal
scholars . . . see property in resources as consisting of the infinitely divisible claims to possession,
use, disposition, and profit that people might have with respect to those things.” Thomas C.
Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 30 (1986) (footnote omitted).
67. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
68. Baker, supra note 53, at 197; Engstrom, supra note 53, at 1200; Galle, supra note 53, at
161.
69. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667.
70. See id. at 2668 (“[The] Court’s authority . . . extends . . . to determining whether . . .
proposed condemnations are for a ‘public use’ . . . .”). Regarding decisions such as Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), one commentator has noted that “court cases
appear . . . to have made [public use] determinations political questions for legislatures,”
SCHULTZ, supra note 31, at 73 (emphasis added). This comment was more a description of the
chances of mounting a successful public use challenge rather than an assessment that the Court
had subsumed the public use inquiry into the political question doctrine.
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cases as decided on the merits—albeit under a weak rational basis
standard—while at the same time apply the label nonjusticiable to
71
General Welfare Clause challenges.
Nonetheless, this disparity of terminology seems incorrect after
Kelo and Lingle, which together stand for the proposition that a
takings challenge can rarely, if ever, succeed when predicated solely
on an allegation that the taken property will not sufficiently benefit
the public.72 Kelo and Lingle do not foreclose plaintiffs’ ability to
challenge conduct as a taking even when the government believes it is
73
not, and private property owners can, of course, still seek just
compensation for takings.74 But public use challenges are in a separate
category. The Court tepidly suggested that it would still police
75
extreme abuses of power in this regard, possibly under the Due
Process Clause rather than the Takings Clause,76 but in general, “the

71. Compare Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667 (“[E]mpirical debates over the wisdom of takings—no
less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be
carried out in the federal courts.”), and id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This deferential
standard of review echoes the rational-basis test used to review economic regulation under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.” (citation omitted)), with South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987) (“The level of deference to the congressional decision is such that the
Court has . . . questioned whether ‘general welfare’ is a judicially enforceable restriction at
all.”).
72. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2005) (“Whatever the merits
of [Chevron’s claim that Hawaii’s rent cap will not serve the legitimate public purpose of
controlling retail gas prices], it does not sound under the Takings Clause.”); cf. Kelo, 125 S. Ct.
at 2664 (“‘[I]t is only the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics’ . . . that matters in determining
public use.” (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)); id. at 2671
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of “effectively . . . delet[ing] the words ‘for public
use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment”).
73. In many cases, a suit that seeks to classify governmental conduct as a taking is the
effective equivalent to a suit for injunctive relief because, if successful, the government will be
unwilling or unable to pay the just compensation and will instead pursue a different course of
conduct. As such, plaintiffs can still prevent the government from taking their property in many
instances.
74. But see Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An American Original, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 355, 355
(2005) (“Like all eminent domain cases, the Kelo condemnations raised the typical questions of
valuation for the property to be taken, where the rules of the game are all rigged in favor of the
government entity.”).
75. The Kelo majority noted that a city “[would not] be allowed to take property under the
mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.” 125
S. Ct. at 2661.
76. Or, at the very least, the analysis will be identical to that used for due process
challenges. Compare Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]ransfers intended to
confer benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual
public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”), with Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2083 (“[A]
regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or
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government [can] do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.” In
Lingle, the Court discussed the Public Use Clause in the context of
regulatory takings and concluded that the question of whether a
regulation is effective is “logically . . . distinct from the question
whether a regulation effects a taking.”78 Any sort of heightened
means-ends review, explained Justice O’Connor, “would empower—
and might often require—courts to substitute their predictive
judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies.”79
This is “a task for which courts are not well suited,”80 as the Lingle
81
lower court proceedings demonstrate. Rather, such arguments about

irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause.”) and id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[T]oday’s decision does not foreclose the possibility that a regulation might be so
arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process.”).
77. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667 n.19 (quoting E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)); see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (“Equitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of
private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be
brought against the sovereign . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314–15 (1987) (“[The Takings Clause] does
not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of
[the] power . . . to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting
to a taking.” (citations omitted)); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1018 n.21 (“To the extent that the
operation of the statute provides compensation, no taking has occurred and the [property
owner] has no claim against the Government.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) (“The
rights of these property owners are satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the
Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking.”) .
78. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2084.
79. Id. at 2085.
80. Id. Quoting a passage from Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240–41
(1984), which itself borrowed language from an earlier case, United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch,
327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946), Justice O’Connor wrote in her Kelo dissent:
Because courts are ill-equipped to evaluate the efficacy of proposed legislative
initiatives, we rejected as unworkable the idea of courts’ “‘deciding on what is and is
not a governmental function and . . . invalidating legislation on the basis of their view
on that question at the moment of decision, a practice which has proved impracticable
in other fields.’”
125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
81. Each time the district court heard essentially the same evidence from two expert
economists with opposing views, it reached contradictory conclusions. Compare Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1187 (D. Haw. 2002) (finding that if oil
companies increased wholesale prices to offset the revenue loss caused by the rent cap, service
station owners would “respond to the increase in the wholesale price by raising retail prices”
(emphasis added)), with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1013 (D. Haw.
1998) (finding “no economic reason why a shift from paying a certain sum as ‘rent’ to paying
that same sum as ‘fuel price’ would lead a dealer to react by raising his gas prices when his
overall costs remain[ed] the same” (emphases added)). Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court
viewed the lower court proceedings as “remarkable, to say the least.” Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2085;
cf. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 177 (1987)
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a regulation’s impact “are better directed to Congress” than to the
82
courts.
The Court’s public use cases in the physical takings context—
83
exemplified by Berman v. Parker, Hawaii Housing Authority v.
84
Midkiff, and now Kelo—also accord considerable deference to a
legislature’s judgment that an exercise of eminent domain is for
85
public use. These cases have “embraced the broader and more
natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose,’”86 rather than
87
requiring actual use by the public or some other intermediate
interpretation.88 In Kelo, the Court held that because the city’s
development plan “unquestionably serves a public purpose, the
takings . . . satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth
Amendment.”89 Outside an “unusual exercise of government power”90
in which “the property of A [is taken] for the sole purpose of
transferring it to another private party B . . . . under the mere pretext

(“Litigation based upon hypothetical possibility rather than concrete fact is apt to be poor
litigation.”).
82. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1015 n.18.
83. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
84. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
85. Whether Kelo is an extension of the Court’s prior cases concerning the appropriate
level of deference to a legislature’s determination of public use is the crux of the disagreement
between the majority and the dissent. Compare Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663–66 (discussing Berman,
348 U.S. at 26, and Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 229, and holding that there is “no principled
way of distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes” recognized in
those cases), with id. at 2673–75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s holding
abandons its role “in reviewing a legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use . . .
[though] the Court in Berman made clear that it is ‘an extremely narrow’ one.” (quoting Haw.
Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 240 (alteration and omission in original))), and id. at 2675 (“[T]he
Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use.”).
86. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662.
87. See, e.g., id. at 2681–82 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Court’s early public
use decisions as requiring “the government or the public [to] actually use[] the taken property”).
88. Justice O’Connor would read the Public Use Clause as a limitation requiring that the
“precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society.” Id. at
2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In Justice O’Connor’s view, Berman and Hawaii Housing
Authority stand for the proposition that a valid public benefit can accrue when the taking of
property itself eliminates a public harm. Id. This approach would partially undermine the
argument that public use plaintiffs could be denied standing because the conduct that causes the
harm—the taking of property—is the same conduct that causes the public benefit.
89. Id. at 2665.
90. Id. at 2667.
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91
of a public purpose,” federal courts will not second guess a
legislature’s use of eminent domain.92
Once public use is equated with “public purpose,” the condition
that a taking be “for public use” begins to sound quite similar to the
93
condition that a tax or expenditure be “for the general welfare.” In
fact, the General Welfare Clause itself has been described as “[t]he
power of Congress to authorize [an] expenditure of public moneys for
public purposes.”94 The Court will not review a congressional exercise
of that power unless there is “no reasonable possibility” that a tax or
95
expenditure is for the general welfare. Likewise, as long as a
legislature’s public use determination is “not irrational,” the Public
96
Use Clause cannot be used to enjoin a taking. As the Court has
indicated, “[w]hen the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its
means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates

91. Id. at 2661. An early Supreme Court case listed several hypothetical examples of
obviously invalid laws, one of which was “a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B.”
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). This case has been employed as a rhetorical
flourish by all sides in the public use debate. Compare Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661 & n.5 (quoting
Calder to support the idea that New London “would no doubt be forbidden from taking
petitioners’ land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party”),
with id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Calder to emphasize that Kelo “abandons
this long-held, basic limitation on government power”), and id. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Calder to support the argument that “[t]he Public Use Clause . . . embodied the
Framers’ understanding that property is a natural, fundamental right, prohibiting the
government from ‘tak[ing] property from A. and giv[ing] it to B’”).
92. Id. at 2667. The role that the Court has carved out for itself in public use cases is “‘an
extremely narrow’ one,” Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (quoting
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)), and, contrary to the conventional wisdom, appears to
be present in general welfare cases as well. The Court will invalidate a taking if the legislature’s
public use determination is “irrational,” cf. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667, just as a tax will be
invalidated if there is “no reasonable possibility” that it serves the general welfare, United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936). See also supra note 59. Interestingly, the Kelo majority
implicitly compared its deferential approach to the deference accorded to the legislature in
matters of taxation. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667 n.18 (“The power to tax is not the power to
destroy while this Court sits.” (quoting Panhandle Oil Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218,
223 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
93. This is the inverse of the comparison made by Justice Thomas in his Kelo dissent. See
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Tellingly, the phrase ‘public use’ contrasts
with the very different phrase ‘general Welfare’ used elsewhere in the Constitution.”); see also
supra notes 42–53 and accompanying text.
94. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90–91 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936)).
95. Butler, 297 U.S. at 67.
96. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667.
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over the wisdom of takings . . . are not to be carried out in the federal
97
courts.”
Just as an otherwise valid regulation is not an unconstitutional
98
taking “merely by virtue of its ineffectiveness or foolishness,” valid
taxes and expenditures do not violate the General Welfare Clause
99
because they may be “bad, unwise, or unworkable.” To be sure, “a
regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective
may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process
Clause,”100 and a violation of the General Welfare Clause that is “a
display of arbitrary power” may likewise violate other constitutional
provisions.101 But the idea that legislatures are better suited than
courts to decide if a particular course of conduct is for a public
purpose would seem to be true whether that decision is made in the
context of the power to tax and spend102 or the power to take private
103
property in exchange for just compensation. When public use is
defined broadly as public purpose, little distinction remains between
the Court’s role in adjudicating the condition that a taking be “for
public use” and the condition that a tax or expenditure be “for the
general welfare.”
Admittedly, the distinction in terminology used to describe these
two clauses may have little real-world impact—either way, the
plaintiffs lose. Sometimes, however, semantic differences are useful
for what they reveal about the underlying conceptual framework that
104
For centuries, the American
produced those differences.
constitutional tradition sanctified private property as a critical
mechanism for protecting individual liberty against government

97. Id. (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43).
98. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2005).
99. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91 (internal quotations omitted).
100. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2084.
101. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
102. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 90 (“It is for Congress to decide which expenditures will
promote the general welfare.”).
103. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2676 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he judiciary cannot get bogged down in predictive judgments about whether the public will
actually be better off after a property transfer.”).
104. Cf. Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock, Introduction to CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE
CONSTITUTION 1, 1–4, 7–11 (Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988) (discussing how “the
limits and possibilities of . . . language” influenced the way that the drafters of the Constitution
conveyed the ideas they wanted to embody in it).
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105
interference. Dean Treanor explains that the Takings Clause was
included in the Bill of Rights to correct for the failure of the political
process to protect landowners, an insular minority that James
Madison considered to be “peculiarly vulnerable to majoritarian
decisionmaking.”106 Treanor argues that when applying the Framers’
intent107 to takings in the modern context, courts should only order
compensation for today’s equivalent of 1791 landowners, that is,
insular minorities that are particularly unlikely to receive
compensation through the political process.108 The implication of this
approach is that court access is unnecessary whenever the political
process compensates property owners, as it did the plaintiffs in Kelo
as well as those in other eminent domain cases.109

105. “The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their property. That
right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances where it has not been taken away
or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
627 (1885) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817–18 (K.B.)). The
centrality of property, as expressed in these early cases, is closely connected to the protections
of individual liberties that the Court developed during the twentieth century. For example, the
Court has explained the constitutional basis for a fundamental right of privacy by reference to
the importance of property articulated in Entick and Boyd:
The principles laid down in this opinion [by Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington]
affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. . . . It is not the breaking
of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property . . . .
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 n.* (1965) (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (citation
omitted)).
106. Treanor, supra note 66, at 847–48. Although “the framers anticipated that property
owners would dominate the new government and that such persons could be relied on to respect
property rights,” Madison nevertheless considered it necessary to ensure that “extended
representation would diffuse the tendency of majority factions at the state level to oppress the
minority, particularly property owners.” ELY, supra note 32, at 47–49; see also NEDELSKY, supra
note 39, at 32 (arguing that Madison thought the “inevitable inequality of property [distribution]
made [property] particularly vulnerable in a republic” and consequently believed that “the
protection of property was part of the larger problem of protecting minority rights”).
107. For more on “translation” as a method of constitutional interpretation, see generally
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
108. See Treanor, supra note 66, at 887 (“Compensation should be mandated only in those
types of cases where the political process is particularly unlikely to consider property claims
fairly . . . . Today, the cases in which process failure is most likely involve minority groups . . .
and the singling out of individuals or small groups of people.”). This was not so in Kelo, given
that many of the residents affected by the New London redevelopment plan had sold their
homes to the city voluntarily. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005). Thus, it
is reasonable to assume that individuals in the position analogous to that of the Kelo plaintiffs
would not need the courts to obtain compensation.
109. “The political process, through which citizens and interest groups lobby for their
interests to be represented by their legislators, safeguards private property rights, so courts
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The Court and commentators describe the General Welfare
Clause, but not the Public Use Clause, as “effectively
110
nonjusticiable” for the same reason that it sounds radical to argue
that property owners who can depend on the political process to
obtain compensation should not have access to the courts.
Specifically, the rights guaranteed (and, by implication, the powers
granted) by the Takings Clause are presumed to be essentially private
and individual, whereas the powers granted (and, by implication, the
rights guaranteed) by the Taxing and Spending Clause are presumed
to be essentially public. But Treanor’s argument and the similarities
between the Public Use Clause and the General Welfare Clause both
undermine this assumption that the Takings Clause in general, and
the Public Use Clause in particular, necessarily provides a private
judicial remedy. Part II questions the assumption of a judicial remedy
even further by highlighting the doctrinal inconsistency between cases
that describe the scope of standing—often cases in which an
individual seeks to vindicate an environmental damage claim111 or
other “public” interest112—and cases such as Kelo and Lingle, which
rarely mention standing but share many characteristics with cases that
do.

should defer to legislative determinations of public use.” Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking
New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837,
1855 (2005) (footnote omitted). For example, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229 (1984), the state legislature’s plan to break up the state’s system of highly concentrated land
ownership provided compensation to landowners whose land would be taken, id. at 232–34.
110. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
111. See Philip Weinberg, Unbarring the Bar of Justice: Standing in Environmental Suits and
the Constitution, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 27, 27 (2003) (“[S]tanding . . . is often a major [issue
in the] numerous actions brought by concerned citizens and environmental advocacy
organizations to . . . enjoin harmful activities.”).
112. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209–11, 220–
21 (1974) (finding that plaintiffs who sought to enjoin members of Congress from serving in the
military reserves in violation of the Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress from
holding another civil office, lacked standing); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633–34 (1937) (per
curiam) (finding that plaintiffs who claimed that Justice Hugo Black’s Supreme Court
nomination violated the Emoluments Clause—because Justice Black had been a senator when
Congress voted to increase Supreme Court Justices’ retirement benefits—lacked standing); see
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 61, at 70 (noting that standing is usually found when a litigant
claims “a violation of an individual liberty” but not when a litigant claims “a violation of a
constitutional provision dealing with the structure of government”).
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II. PUBLIC USE CLAIMS AS THIRD-PARTY GENERALIZED
GRIEVANCES
When a plaintiff challenges a taking on the ground that the taken
property will not be used in a way that satisfies the Public Use Clause,
that unconstitutional conduct has no relation to the plaintiff’s
injury.113 Such a plaintiff shares that injury with every other citizen,
and a suit to enjoin the taking on a public use ground is essentially a
citizen suit of the kind that has been dismissed in other contexts. The
discussion that follows expands on this argument and explores its
logical corollary—that public use challenges such as Kelo and Lingle
inherently share many essential features with cases that have been
dismissed under the rule prohibiting third-party standing.
The ban on generalized grievances prevents federal courts from
hearing cases in which the alleged injury is “shared in substantially
114
equal measure by all or a large class of citizens” and is designed to
prevent federal courts from being used “to air . . . generalized
115
grievances about the conduct of government.” Just because an
injury happens to be widely shared, however, does not mean that a
case presents a “generalized grievance,”116 and “standing is not to be
117
denied simply because many people suffer the same injury.” In
other words, the doctrine prohibits federal courts from hearing
so-called “citizen suits,” in which a plaintiff seeks to vindicate “the
right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the government be
administered according to law and that the public moneys be not
wasted.”118 Because such suits require courts to resolve questions that
119
are “essentially matter[s] of public and not of individual concern,”

113. See supra Part I.
114. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
115. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 106 (1968)).
116. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 61, at 90 (“The term generalized grievance . . .
[incorrectly] implies that no one would have standing to challenge a blatantly unconstitutional
law applicable to everyone in the country.”).
117. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 687 (1973).
118. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (noting that “although a suitor may derive great comfort
and joy from the fact that the United States Treasury is not cheated . . . or that the Nation’s laws
are faithfully enforced,” neither interest can be vindicated in federal court).
119. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). “The administration of any statute,
likely to produce additional taxation to be imposed upon a vast number of taxpayers, the extent
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this rule ensures that the judicial branch does not impinge upon the
legislative and executive functions by deciding “‘abstract questions of
wide public significance’ [that] amount to ‘generalized grievances,’
pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the
120
representative branches.”
The rationale for the ban on citizen suits is similar to that of the
third-party standing doctrine—both seek to “prevent[] the judicial
process from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of
121
the . . . interests of concerned bystanders” —and the presence of one
of these standing limitations often implicates the other.122 Under the
third-party standing doctrine, a “plaintiff generally must assert his
own legal rights and interests” rather than those of others not before
the court,123 “even when the very same allegedly illegal act that affects

of whose several liability is indefinite and constantly changing, is essentially a matter of public
and not of individual concern.” Id.
120. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975)); see Richardson,
418 U.S. at 179 (“In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate
these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.”); Scalia, supra note 63, at 881–
82 (arguing that the prudential standing limitations are essential for ensuring that “the judicial
[branch] shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers” (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. 1,
art. 30)); cf. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (“The
assumption that if [these plaintiffs] have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a
reason to find standing.”).
121. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687.
122. For example, although an environmental group’s suit to compel compliance with
environmental law is an impermissible citizen suit because no “abstract, self-contained . . . ‘right’
to have the Executive observe the . . . law” exists, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
573 (1992), such a suit also seeks to vindicate the rights of directly affected third parties, namely,
those who actually use or live near the threatened natural resources. Compare id. at 572 n.7
(noting that the plaintiffs effectively sought “standing for persons who have no concrete
interests affected—persons who live (and propose to live) at the other end of the country from the
dam” (emphasis added)), and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (“The alleged
injury will be felt directly only by those who use Mineral King and Sequoia National Park, and
for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the highway and
ski resort.” (emphasis added)), with Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (granting standing to “environmental plaintiffs [who] . . . aver that
they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the
area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity” (emphasis added) (quoting Sierra Club, 405
U.S. at 735)), and SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687 (“Here, [in] contrast [with Sierra Club], the appellees
claimed that the specific and allegedly illegal action . . . would directly harm them in their use of
the natural resources of the Washington Metropolitan Area.” (emphasis added)).
123. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 83
(4th ed. 2003) (“[A] plaintiff can assert only injuries that he or she has suffered . . . [and] cannot
present the claims of third parties who are not part of the lawsuit.”).
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124
the litigant also affects a third party.” Like the Article III
125
justiciability requirements, the third-party standing doctrine helps
to ensure the “concrete adverseness” that “sharpens the presentation
126
upon which federal courts depend for effective
of issues”
constitutional adjudication because “third parties themselves usually
will be the best proponents of their own rights.”127 More
fundamentally, however, the third-party standing and citizen-suit
doctrines both ensure that the judicial branch remains within its
sphere of competence and constitutional authority.128 “Without such

124. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990).
125. Article III extends the judicial power of the United States “to all Cases” and
“Controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl.1. The five justiciability doctrines—standing,
ripeness, mootness, the prohibition against advisory opinions, and the political question
doctrine—are derived from Article III of the Constitution. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured
Constitutional Steps, 71 IND. L.J. 297, 304 (1996).
The Court has established particular tests for each of these justiciability doctrines, and the
standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to show that an injury caused by the defendant is likely to
be redressed by a favorable court decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. Although the third-party
standing doctrine is a prudential limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts, Kowalski v.
Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128 (2004), the Court has treated the ban on citizen suits as a
constitutional requirement. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court invalidated a citizensuit provision in the Endangered Species Act and implied that the “case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III” prohibits Congress from authorizing citizen suits by statute. 504 U.S.
at 560, 564, 575. See also Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 209 (1992) (criticizing what he describes as
“[b]y far the most important and novel holding in Lujan . . .[,] that Congress cannot grant
standing to citizens”). More recently, however, the Court explained that the citizen-suit ban is
“closely related to Art[icle] III . . . but essentially [a] matter[] of judicial self-governance.” Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 500 (1975)). Regardless of whether the ban on citizen suits is constitutional or prudential,
its application by courts serves to limit the availability of judicial review for some constitutional
clauses. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179 (noting that dismissal as a citizen suit essentially
renders the Statements and Accounts Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, immune from judicial
review).
126. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The value of “concreteness” may be
questionable, however. “On the one hand, the Supreme Court has insisted on justiciability
criteria that aim to make adjudication concrete, rather than abstract. On the other hand, it often
relies upon abstract formalist reasoning to resolve cases on the merits, thereby gaining no
benefit from the concrete context.” David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of
Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 813–14
(2004). Note that this observation may be less true for decisions on the merits in lower courts.
127. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976). But see Scalia, supra note 63, at 891
(“Often the very best adversaries are national organizations such as the NAACP or the
American Civil Liberties Union that have a keen interest in the abstract question at issue in the
case, but no ‘concrete injury in fact’ whatever.”).
128. See Scalia, supra note 63, at 894–96 (“[T]he law of standing roughly restricts courts to
their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals . . . and excludes them from the
even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches should function . . . .”);
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limitations—closely related to Art[icle] III concerns but essentially
matters of judicial self-governance—the courts would be called upon
to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though
other governmental institutions may be more competent to address
129
the questions . . . .”
Despite these concerns about institutional competence and the
role of the judicial branch, the Court has permitted third-party suits
when two conditions are present. First, a plaintiff must have a “‘close’
relationship” to the third party whose rights the plaintiff is asserting,
and second, some obstacle must prevent the third party from
130
131
protecting her own interests. For example, in Gilmore v. Utah,
after a death row inmate voluntarily waived his right to appeal, the
Court denied his mother standing to seek a stay of his execution
because nothing prevented him from pursuing his claim in court.132 As
Gilmore demonstrated, however, whether the parties themselves are
closely related is irrelevant. Rather, the plaintiff’s interests must be
closely aligned with those of the third party.
Thus, in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,133 a father
alleging that the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance
violated the First Amendment was denied standing to sue his
daughter’s school district.134 Although the same allegedly
unconstitutional act—the school’s daily recital of the Pledge—injured
both Newdow’s parental right to “inculcat[e] his child with his views

cf. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 473 (1982) (“The exercise of the judicial power also affects relationships between the
coequal arms of the National Government. The effect is, of course, most vivid when a federal
court declares unconstitutional an act of the Legislative or Executive Branch.”).
129. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
130. Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129–30; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991); Singleton, 428
U.S. at 114–16. The Court has emphasized that both these conditions must be present to allow
third-party standing. See Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129–30 (“[A] party seeking third-party standing
[must] make [these] two . . . showings.”); Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116 (“Even where the
relationship is close, the reasons for requiring persons to assert their own rights . . . still apply.”);
see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 447 (1998) (plurality opinion) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“While . . . [the] petitioner has a significant stake in challenging the statute and a
close relationship with her father, she has not demonstrated a substantial hindrance to her
father’s ability to assert his own rights.”).
131. 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (per curiam).
132. Id. at 1017 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. (“[A death row inmate’s] access to the
courts is entirely unimpeded and therefore a third party has no standing to litigate an Eighth
Amendment claim—or indeed any other claim—on his behalf.”).
133. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
134. Id. at 4–5.
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on religion” and his daughter’s First Amendment rights (had she
135
wished to vindicate them), the Court viewed Newdow’s injury—and
thus his standing—as deriving entirely from his relationship with his
136
daughter. But because the Court believed that Newdow’s interest
was “in many respects antagonistic” to the interests of his daughter—
she was not offended by the phrase “under God”137—the Court held
138
that the rule against third-party standing prohibited his suit.
In Kelo and Lingle, the Court could plausibly have questioned
the plaintiffs’ standing to enjoin a violation of the Public Use Clause,
because that violation would not exist but for the injury suffered by
other citizens qua citizens, who were unable to seek judicial relief.
Moreover, the interests of plaintiffs who sue to enjoin a taking on the
ground that it is not for a public use “are not parallel and, indeed, are
139
potentially in conflict” with those of the public. For example, most
New London residents presumably would support a plan to improve
the city’s economy, create jobs, and increase tax revenues. Given that
the success or failure of the redevelopment plan in Kelo has no
140
bearing on the plaintiffs’ injuries, their interest in enjoining the plan
entirely—based on a claim that the plan will in fact fail—conflicts
with the public’s interest in the plan’s success.
This conflict of interest is even more apparent in Lingle: a
disgruntled consumer could not sue to enjoin a price-control
regulation on the ground that the regulation would not actually lower
prices.141 Citizens do not have standing to drag legislators who enact
foolish laws into federal court, neither after an act’s ineffectiveness
becomes apparent, nor beforehand, when reasonable people—and

135. Id. at 15.
136. All the Justices appeared to agree on this point. Compare id. (“Newdow’s standing
derives entirely from his relationship with his daughter.”), with id. at 24 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“While she is intimately associated with the source of respondent’s
standing (the father-daughter relationship and respondent’s rights thereunder), the daughter is
not the source of respondent’s standing; instead it is their relationship that provides respondent
his standing . . . .” (second emphasis added)).
137. Id. at 5, 15. The girl’s mother had informed the lower court that “her daughter is a
Christian who believes in God and has no objection either to reciting or hearing others recite
the Pledge of Allegiance.” Id. at 10.
138. Id. at 13–18.
139. Id. at 15.
140. See supra notes 7–16 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 17–27 and accompanying text.
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142
even reasonable economists—still disagree about its impact. The
only remedy available to such a consumer would be to lobby for a
more effective regulation or to support the campaigns of
economically astute legislators in the next election. In Lingle,
Chevron wanted to enjoin the rent cap entirely,143 whereas consumers
presumably wanted gasoline price regulations that actually lowered
prices at the pump. Imagine that gasoline consumers decided to lobby
for more effective gas price controls while Chevron simultaneously
sought relief in federal court. Such consumers, who are directly
harmed by the rent cap’s ineffectiveness, would be seeking relief from
the legislature while Chevron, whose injury bears no relation to the
act’s effectiveness, would be bringing its claims before the court.144
The proposition that cases such as Lingle and Kelo could have
been dismissed for lack of standing is counterintuitive and has never
been a factor in the Court’s takings decisions, which in the public-use
context do not even mention standing. The Court’s standing cases
have often been criticized for drawing arbitrary distinctions,145 and the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts used standing in a way that suggests a
146
skepticism of certain types of claims. Taking that criticism one step
further, the fact that standing issues tend to be raised in connection
147
with environmental claims, rather than in connection with property

142. The district court reached its decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. by evaluating
the testimony of two expert economists, one for Chevron and one for Hawaii. 125 S. Ct. 2078,
2084 (2005).
143. See id. at 2084 (“Chevron’s claim is simply that Hawaii’s rent cap will not actually serve
the State’s legitimate interest in protecting consumers against high gasoline prices.”).
144. See id. (“The owner of a property subject to a regulation that effectively serves a
legitimate interest may be just as singled out and just as burdened as the owner of a property
subject to an ineffective regulation.”); see supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1324–25 (1995) (discussing the Court’s notable standing decisions
and commenting that many seem irreconcilable with the others); Sunstein, supra note 125, at
209 (claiming that the distinction to forbid a citizen suit is “quite a stretch”); cf. Covington v.
Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 651 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring) (“A theory that
‘injury to all is injury to none’ seems wrong in theory, for it would deny standing to every citizen
such that no matter how badly the whole may be hurt, none of the parts could ever have
standing to go to court to cure a harmful violation.”).
146. See Stearns, supra note 145, at 1326–27 (noting that although the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts used standing in ways consistent with social-choice theory, the doctrine was first created
to “stave off unwelcome challenges to New Deal regulatory programs”).
147. See Weinberg, supra note 111, at 27 (explaining that “standing . . . is often a major
[issue]” in the “numerous actions brought by concerned citizens and environmental advocacy
organizations to . . . enjoin harmful activities”).
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148
149
claims, itself indicates a systemic bias in favor of property rights,
stemming in part from the axiomatic status of property rights in the
American constitutional tradition.150
In few takings cases has a Justice explicitly suggested that a
consistent application of the Court’s standing jurisprudence might

148. An interesting counterexample is Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), in which
several property owners sued the United States Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) under the
citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000), to
enjoin the FWS from taking certain actions to protect two species of endangered fish, Bennett,
520 U.S. at 159–60. The plaintiffs alleged that they would suffer economic loss to their property,
but the lower courts denied standing because the plaintiffs’ claims were not within the “zone of
interests” protected by the ESA, finding that “only plaintiffs who allege an interest in the
preservation of endangered species fall within the zone of interests protected by the ESA.” Id. at
161 (quoting Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Supreme Court reversed
in a unanimous decision and granted the plaintiffs standing. Id. at 164–66. The Court held that
because the “zone of interests” test was a prudential bar to standing, Congress could—and did
in the ESA—legislatively circumvent it. Id. at 161–66. Bennett serves as an interesting contrast
to Lujan, in which plaintiffs were denied standing to sue to prevent the government from
engaging in conduct that would allegedly injure endangered species. Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63, 578 (1992); see infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the significance of Bennett, see generally Robert S. Nix, Comment, Bennett v.
Spear: Justice Scalia Oversees the Latest “Battle” in the “War” Between Property Rights and
Environmentalism, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 745 (1997).
149. The Court’s opinion of statutes containing citizen-suit provisions is exemplified by the
assumption that “plaintiffs seeking to enforce theses statutes as private attorneys general
[allege] injuries [that] are ‘noneconomic’ and probably noncompensable.” Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). In Pennell v. City of San
Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), one of the few cases to question the standing of a takings plaintiff, the
Court considered whether landlords had standing to challenge the validity of a rent-control
ordinance that had never been applied to their properties, id. at 6–7. Although the Court
conceded that “it is speculative” whether the ordinance would injure any of the plaintiffs, the
Court found standing because “application of the constitutional standing requirement [is not] a
mechanical exercise.” Id. at 6–7 (alteration in original) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751 (1984)). Of course, the Court’s standing jurisprudence in environmental cases has been
criticized as precisely that—an overly formal mechanical exercise. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at
592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for “demand[ing] what is likely an empty
formality” when, to demonstrate a sufficiently imminent injury for standing, the Court requires
that plaintiffs allege a “description of concrete plans” to return to a region whose environment
is allegedly threatened by the challenged conduct).
150. In this vein, Professor Laura Underkuffler explains a “hidden rationale” running
through the Court’s takings cases:
[T]he conception of property as a ‘right’ which ‘protects’ is driven by the underlying
assumption that the case involves the assertion of the highly prized values associated
with property against those of an unrelated (and lesser-valued) public interest. We
assume that the core values, which the individual interest asserts, are presumptively
superior to the core values that the competing public interest involves.
UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 36, at 156. Whether the Takings Clause in fact elevates such
presumptions to constitutional status is questionable. See supra notes 31 and 104–09 and
accompanying text.
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deny standing to a takings plaintiff. In Lucas v. South Carolina
151
Coastal Council, the Court held that a regulation to prevent coastal
erosion was a taking because it denied the plaintiff all “economically
152
viable use of his land.” Justice Blackmun noted, in his vehement
dissent, that if the principles the Court had enunciated several days
earlier in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife153 were to be applied
154
consistently, then the plaintiff in Lucas should be denied standing.
The Lujan plaintiffs sued, under the Endangered Species Act, to
prevent the construction of a dam that they alleged would harm
protected species.155 The plaintiffs had visited the vicinity, observed
various threatened species in their natural habitat, and intended to
visit again. The Court, however, denied standing because “‘some day’
intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even
any specification of when the some day w[ould] be—d[id] not support
a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that [the Court’s] cases
require[d].”156 Justice Blackmun, quoting this language, pointed out
that the same problem was present in Lucas: the plaintiff “failed to
demonstrate any immediate concrete plans to build or sell.”157 In
other words, the plaintiff should have been denied standing because

151. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
152. Id. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
153. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
154. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1043 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563.
156. Id. at 564. Five years after Lujan was decided, Justice Scalia discussed the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA in surprisingly broad, inclusive terms:
[The ESA] says that ‘any person may commence a civil suit’—an authorization of
remarkable breadth when compared with the language Congress ordinarily uses. . . .
Our readiness to take the term ‘any person’ at face value is greatly augmented by two
interrelated considerations: that the overall subject matter of this legislation is the
environment (a matter in which it is common to think all persons have an interest)
and that the obvious purpose of the particular provision in question is to encourage
enforcement by so-called ‘private attorneys general’ . . . . Given these factors, we
think the conclusion of expanded standing . . . to the full extent permitted under
Article III [is warranted].
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164–66 (1997) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2000)); see also
supra note 148. This language from Bennett is less surprising when viewed in context—in sharp
contrast to Lujan, the plaintiffs in Bennett were owners of private property seeking to enjoin the
government’s conduct to prevent an economic injury to their private property. Bennett, 520 U.S.
at 159–60. In Lujan, the plaintiffs sought to prevent damage to the environment, which is, of
course, the express purpose of the ESA. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559 (noting that the action was
filed by an organization “dedicated to wildlife conservation and other environmental causes”).
Nevertheless, unlike the plaintiffs in Lujan, the plaintiffs in Bennett were accorded standing.
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164–66.
157. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1043 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the alleged injury depended on his “‘[s]ome day’ intentions” to use
158
the property.
CONCLUSION
Whether the plaintiffs had standing in Lujan and its ilk159 on the
one hand, and Lucas—or for that matter Kelo and Lingle—on the
other, is beside the point. Rather, the fact that standing is central to
the inquiry in Lujan but not even discussed in Lucas is emblematic of
how the property paradigm intrinsic in the constitutional order colors
the development of a procedural doctrine such as standing.160 The
disparity between the characterizations of the Public Use and
General Welfare Clauses is another manifestation of how jurists’
thinking about property pervades the interpretation of seemingly
unrelated constitutional clauses.161 According to the conventional
wisdom, the United States in the first century following the
Revolutionary War was a “quintessentially Lockean” society
exemplified by economic individualism and vested natural rights162 in
which the law’s primary purpose was to ensure that private property
158. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)).
159. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
173, 183 (2000) (finding standing to sue under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2005), for
discharge into a river); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 105 (1998) (finding
no standing to sue a company for violations of a statute that required companies to report the
presence of toxic chemicals); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64 (finding no standing to sue to prevent
development that would allegedly injure endangered species); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497
U.S. 871, 881–82, 886–89, 900 (1990) (finding no standing to challenge mining on federal lands
by plaintiffs who used only a small part of affected lands); United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687–90 (1973) (finding standing to
challenge a federal policy that would allegedly decrease the nation’s air quality); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732, 735, 741 (1972) (finding no standing under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2005), to sue to enjoin development in part of the Sequoia
National Forest).
160. The effect of Lujan’s requirement of a “concrete and particularized” injury is that
“very ‘old’—traditional common law—property is . . . ‘more owned,’ so far as the federal courts
are concerned,” than is “new” property created by statutory entitlement programs. Robert
Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 65–66 & n.194 (2005).
Analogously, “the U.S. Supreme Court’s ‘takings’ jurisprudence . . . appears to be bringing
greater security to ‘old’ property even against democratically decided actions by the state, [such
that] traditional assets definitely look to be increasingly ‘asset-like’” relative to statutory
entitlement programs, id. at 65–66 n.195, not to mention relative to public rights such as
environmental rights.
161. See supra notes 64–71, 110–112 and accompanying text.
162. See NOVAK, supra note 31, at 6 (“Nineteenth-century political ideology . . . was
quintessentially Lockean, suffused with a passion for private rights and predestined for market
capitalism.”).
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owners retained “virtually uncontrolled dominion over the use and
163
disposition of [their] property.” Although subsequent scholarship
has shed considerable doubt on the accuracy of this assessment,164 it
165
continues to hold sway for many and has contributed to the
development of standing as an obstacle to vindicating interests not
predicated on traditional property rights.166 To be sure, the Court has
repeatedly stated that aesthetic and environmental injuries stand on
equal footing with economic injuries: “Aesthetic and environmental
well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the
quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular
environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few
does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the
167
judicial process.” If the Court is to be taken at its word, however,
then perhaps it ought not require plaintiffs alleging the former to
meet formalistic standing requirements while it assumes that plaintiffs
alleging the latter automatically meet those requirements.

163. Scheiber, supra note 31, at 221 (alteration in original) (quoting B. SCHWARTZ, A
COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S., PART III: THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 231
(1965)); see EPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 16 (“The Lockean system was dominant at the time when
the Constitution was adopted . . . , and the protection of property against its enemies was a
central and recurrent feature of the political thought of the day.”); HORWITZ, supra note 31, at
31 (“In the eighteenth century, the right to property had been the right to absolute dominion
over land . . . .”).
164. See, e.g., Scheiber, supra note 31, at 231 (“We find, therefore, no historical monolith
that bespeaks a single-minded devotion to the sacred rights of private property.”); see also
ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 36–42 (discussing the limitations on traditional private property
rights that Jefferson and others advocated to achieve various ends for society); NOVAK, supra
note 31, at 6 (detailing the breadth and depth of nineteenth-century regulation of private
property and the extent that the resultant infringement on property rights was generally
accepted); cf. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 7–9 (1956)
(exploring and reassessing “the myth of our laissez faire past”).
165. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights and the Federal Government, in THE GREAT
RIGHTS 41, 58–60 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1963) (arguing that the Takings Clause provides no
leeway for courts to balance its proscription against the public interest); cf. JOHN BRIGHAM,
PROPERTY AND THE POLITICS OF ENTITLEMENT 7 (1990) (“[T]he right wing in the legal
academy has been intellectually provocative in its arguments that . . . the . . . Takings Clause
provide[s] a basis for dismantling the welfare state.”).
166. See supra notes 145–58 and accompanying text.
167. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)); see also Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992) (“Of course, the desire to use or observe an
animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for
purpose of standing.”).

